The Poor Man: Going Postel

Jeffrey Lewis has a copy (.pdf) of the Final Report of the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Independent Review Team (IRT), a critique of the management of the $100+ billion project. Not knowing anything about the inner workings of the project, I can’t say whether or not the IRT’s analysis is useful or accurate, but I can say with absolute certainty that it meets all specs for a deadly boring read. Lewis highlights this passage for special attention:

Successful test intercepts will send a strong message to adversaries of the U.S., who may be dissuaded by the effectiveness of the system from investing further in ballistic missile forces and/or be deterred from attacking the U.S., our deployed forces, our allies, and friends. Therefore, successful flight testing is a strategic issue as well as a key to continued successful system development.

Which is an example of politics driving development - a bad idea in general, but this is a defensible example. Much as North Korea’s decision whether and when to test its supposed nuclear capability is fundamentally a political, not an engineering, decision (as was India’s, as was Pakistan’s), decisions about testing our supposed anti-nuclear capability must take into account the geopolitical considerations of such a test. This naturally militates strongly against testing if you aren’t 100% sure, in both cases - your deterrent is much more effective if your opponent is unsure about your capacity than if he knows you don’t have it, and as these things are all designed to be used as deterrents, this is a significant part of their proper operation. Fair enough.